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T
he US economy has experienced a slowdown in productivity growth since 
the 1970s, which—except for an upward blip between 1996 and 2004—has 
been remarkably persistent. Other developed countries have also experi-
enced this disappointing productivity trend. Moreover, slow productivity growth has 
been accompanied by disappointing real wage growth for most US workers, as well 
as rising wage inequality. 
Innovation is the only way for the most developed countries to secure sustainable 
 long-run productivity growth. For nations farther from the technological frontier, 
 catch-up growth is a viable option, but this cannot be the case for  leading-edge 
economies such as the United States, Japan, and the nations of Western Europe. For 
countries such as these, what are the most effective policies for stimulating techno-
logical innovation? 
In this article, we take a practical approach to addressing this question. If a 
 policymaker came to us with a fixed budget of financial and political capital to invest 
in innovation policy, what would we advise? We discuss a number of the main inno-
vation policy levers and describe the available evidence on their effectiveness: tax 
policies to favor research and development, government research grants, policies 
aimed at increasing the supply of human capital focused on innovation, intellectual 
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property policies, and pro-competitive policies. In the conclusion, we synthesize 
this evidence into a  single-page “toolkit,” in which we rank policies in terms of the 
quality and implications of the available evidence and the policies’ overall impact 
from a social  cost-benefit perspective. We also score policies in terms of their speed 
and likely distributional effects.
We do not claim that innovation policy is the only solution to America’s 
productivity problem. Indeed, even within the United States, many firms are well 
behind the technological frontier, and helping these firms catch up—for example, 
by improving management practices—would likely have very high value. Nonethe-
less, we believe that sensible innovation policy design is a key part of the solution 
for revitalizing leading economies and will lead to large  long-run increases in 
welfare. Before beginning our tour, we start with some background facts and then 
address an obvious question: why should a policymaker spend any resources at all 
on innovation?
Some Background Facts 
In 2015, spending on research and development (R&D) performed in the 
United States stood at just over $495 billion.1 Figure 1 shows how this amount has 
evolved over time since 1953, in total as well as separately for R&D funded by busi-
nesses, the federal government, and other institutions (including state and local 
governments), as a share of GDP. R&D spending as a share of GDP grew from 
around 1.3 percent in 1953 to around 2.7 percent in 2015. Over time, there has 
been a relative decline in the share of R&D funded by the federal government, and 
in 2015, businesses spent more than twice as much as the federal government on 
R&D. Table 1 provides some points of international comparison for these statistics, 
tabulating R&D expenditures and R&D as a share of GDP in the United States, 
the nine other largest economies (as measured by GDP in 2015), and the OECD 
average. The United States spends more on R&D than these other countries, but 
R&D as a share of GDP in the United States is smaller than in Germany and Japan. 
In recent years, around 13 percent of US research and development has been 
performed at colleges and universities. This R&D is also relatively unique in the 
sense that just under half of US R&D on basic research is undertaken at colleges and 
universities. From the perspective of these institutions, in recent years just over half 
of R&D expenditures at US colleges and universities have been federally funded. 
The vast bulk of that funding goes to the life sciences, with smaller amounts going 
to engineering, the physical sciences, and other fields. 
Another set of metrics of innovative activity focus on the scientific workforce. 
The fraction of workers who are researchers grew through 2000 in the United States 
but has been stable between 0.7 and 0.9 percent since. The European Union has a 
similar fraction, while Japan is closer to 1 percent. 
1 Unless otherwise noted, all data and facts in this section—and later in the paper—are drawn from 
National Science Board (2018). 
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One additional metric relevant to the size of the US scientific workforce is the 
number of temporary work visas issued in categories that cover  high-skilled workers: 
 J-1 (exchange visitors),  H-1B, and  L-1 (intracompany transferee) visas. Between 1991 
and 2015, the primary increase in these categories was in  J-1 visas, which increased 
from around 150,000 to over 330,000. The number of  H-1B visas increased from 
around 52,000 in 1991 to nearly 175,000 in 2015. A cap of 65,000  H-1B visas was in 
place over that entire period, implying that the growth was driven by  H-1Bs issued 
to employees of universities, nonprofit research facilities, and government research 
facilities, all of which are exempt from the annual  H-1B quotas. 
Why Should Governments Promote Innovation?
Governments often want to increase innovation in an attempt to encourage 
economic growth; indeed, countries that have higher levels of research and devel-
opment spending are typically richer (see, for example, Jones 2015). However, 
standard economic theory suggests that, in the absence of market failures, it 
would be better for the government to leave investment decisions in the hands of 
private firms. There are many  oft-cited government failures, such as the Concorde 
 Anglo-French supersonic jet (for many other examples, see Lerner 2009). On 
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Figure 1 
US Research and Development as a Share of GDP, by Source of Funds: 1953–2015
Source: This figure displays data from figure 4-3 of National Science Board (2018), chap. 4. The original 
data are drawn from the National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering 
Statistics, National Patterns of R&D Resources (annual series). 
Notes: The figure shows how spending on R&D performed in the United States, presented as a share of 
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the other hand, there are also many examples of impressive inventions built on 
 government-sponsored R&D, such as jet engines, radar, nuclear power, the Global 
Positioning System (GPS), and the internet ( Janeway 2012; Mazzucato 2013).
Knowledge spillovers are the central market failure on which economists have 
focused when justifying government intervention in innovation. If one firm creates 
something truly innovative, this knowledge may spill over to other firms that either 
copy or learn from the original research—without having to pay the full research 
and development costs. Ideas are promiscuous; even with a  well-designed intel-
lectual property system, the benefits of new ideas are difficult to monetize in full. 
There is a long academic literature documenting the existence of these positive 
spillovers from innovations. 
That said, economic theory also suggests that research and development expen-
ditures in a market economy can be either too low or too high, depending on the net 
size of knowledge spillovers relative to what could be termed product market spill-
overs. The key idea behind product market spillovers is that private incentives can 
lead to business-stealing overinvestment in R&D because innovator firms may steal 
market share from other firms without necessarily generating any social benefit. A 
classic example is the case of pharmaceuticals, where one firm may spend billions 
of dollars to develop a drug that is only incrementally better than a drug produced 
by a rival firm—a “me too” drug. However, the small improvement in therapeutic 
Table 1  
International Comparison of Research and Development 
Expenditures in 2015
Country
R&D expenditures 
(billions of US$)
R&D/GDP 
(%)
United States 496.6 2.7
China 408.8 2.1
India 50.3 0.6
Japan 170.0 3.3
Germany 114.8 2.9
Russia 38.1 1.1
Brazil 38.4 1.2
France 60.8 2.2
United Kingdom 46.3 1.7
Indonesia 2.1 0.1
OECD (average) 34.7 2.4
Source: These data are drawn from table 4-5 of National Science Board (2018), 
chap. 4. The original data are drawn from the OECD, Main Science and Technology 
Indicators (2017/1); United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization Institute for Statistics Data Centre (http://data.uis.unesco.org/; 
accessed October 13, 2017). 
Notes: This table displays data on gross domestic expenditures on R&D (reported in 
purchasing power parity adjusted billions of US dollars) and R&D as a share of GDP 
for the United States, the nine other countries with the largest GDP in 2015, and the 
OECD average (averaged over all 36 member countries as of 2015). 
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value may allow the second firm to capture nearly the entire market. In cases where 
“me too” drugs are therapeutically indistinguishable from the products that they 
replace (and setting aside the possibility that such drugs may generate the benefit 
of  price-cutting competition), this dynamic potentially generates a massive private 
benefit for shareholders of pharmaceutical firms, with little gain for patients. 
Broadly stated, three methods have been used to estimate spillovers: case 
studies, a production function approach, and research based on patent counts.
Perhaps the most famous example of the case study approach is Griliches (1958), 
which estimates the social rate of return realized by public and private investments 
in hybrid corn research. Griliches estimates an annual return of 700 percent, as of 
1955, on the average dollar invested in hybrid corn research. Seed or corn producers 
appropriated almost none of these returns; they were instead passed to consumers 
in the form of lower prices and higher output. While this study is widely cited, Grili-
ches himself discusses the challenges inherent in calculating the rate of return on 
something akin to a successful “oil well.” Although we typically observe an estimate 
that captures the cost of drilling and developing a successful well, we would ideally 
prefer to generate an estimate that includes the cost of all of the “dry holes” drilled 
before oil was struck. For more specific examples of diffusion, see the data compiled 
by Comin and Hobijn (2010).
The production function approach abandons the details of specific tech-
nologies and instead relates productivity growth (or other measures of innovative 
output) to lagged measures of investment in research and development. The 
key challenge here is that R&D is determined by many factors that also indepen-
dently affect productivity. Recent papers applying this approach have used policy 
experiments that influence R&D investments to identify the arrow of causality (for 
example, Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen 2013). 
The key idea in using patent citations to measure spillovers is that each patent 
cites other patents, all of which form the basis of “prior art”—existing innovations 
that enabled that particular patent. Trajtenberg (1990) and Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and 
Henderson (1993) pioneered this approach. Although there is some evidence that 
citations can be strategic (and that some citations are added by patent examiners 
during the course of the patent examination process), the existence of patent cita-
tions provides a measurable indication of knowledge spillovers (see, for example, 
Griffith, Lee, and Van Reenen 2011). As already noted, a challenge with the produc-
tion function approach is finding ways of identifying the relevant channels of 
influence so that “one can detect the path of spillovers in the sands of the data” 
(Griliches 1992). Herein lies an advantage of using patent citations, which provide 
a direct way of inferring which firms receive spillover benefits. 
More generally, the trick in the search for spillovers has been to focus on 
defining a dimension (or dimensions) over which spillovers are mediated. Firms 
less distant from each other in this dimension will be more affected by the research 
and development efforts of their peers. Examples include technological distance 
as revealed from past patenting classes (Jaffe 1986), geographical distance between 
corporate R&D labs, and product market distance (the industries in which firms 
operate). As a whole, this literature on spillovers has consistently estimated that social 
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returns to R&D are much higher than private returns, which provides a justifica-
tion for  government-supported innovation policy. In the United States, for example, 
recent estimates in Lucking, Bloom, and Van Reenen (2018) used three decades of 
 firm-level data and a production function–based approach to document evidence 
of substantial positive net knowledge spillovers. The authors estimate that social 
returns are about 60 percent, compared with private returns of around 15 percent, 
suggesting the case for a substantial increase in public research subsidies. 
Given this evidence on knowledge spillovers, one obvious solution is to 
provide strong intellectual property rights such as patents to inventors as a means 
of increasing the private return to inventing. A patent is a temporary right to 
exclude others from selling the protected invention. Patents entail some effi-
ciency loss because they usually enable sellers to charge a higher price markup 
over production costs. However, this downside could be outweighed by the gains 
in dynamic efficiency that arise from patents providing stronger incentives to do 
more research and development because potential innovators expect to be able 
to appropriate more of the benefits for their efforts. In practice, as we will discuss 
in more detail below, the patent system is highly imperfect. For one thing, other 
firms can frequently invent around a patent—after all, the empirical evidence on 
knowledge spillovers  summarized above is drawn from data on the United States, 
which already has a strong system of intellectual property rights by international 
standards. 
In addition to spillovers, there are other potential justifications for research 
and development subsidies, related to failures in other markets. For example, 
financial constraints may limit the amount of innovation that firms can carry out. 
Because innovation is intangible, it may be hard for firms to raise funding when 
they have no collateral to pledge to banks in return for debt funding. This insight 
suggests that equity might be a better source of funding for innovation, but equity 
faces a different challenge: an asymmetry of information. Before innovations are 
patented or demonstrated in the market, the requisite secrecy about technology 
makes fundraising difficult. A pitch of “trust me, I have a great idea, so please fund 
me” is rarely effective, whereas a pitch of “let me describe my  not-yet-patented idea 
in detail” opens up the possibility of potential investors stealing an idea from the 
entrepreneur. 
Evidence suggests that financial constraints often do hold back innovation (for 
a survey, see Hall and Lerner 2010). However, the presence of financial constraints 
around research and development funding is not necessarily a reason for govern-
ment subsidies: governments often have worse information about project quality 
than either firms or investors, so designing appropriate policy interventions is 
difficult. Effective policies to address financial constraints involve not just financial 
support for firms but also a mechanism to identify and select  higher-quality invest-
ments acurately, which is typically difficult to do.
We now turn to discussing a number of the main innovation policy levers: tax 
policies to favor research and development, government research grants, policies 
aimed at increasing the supply of human capital focused on innovation, intellectual 
property policies, and pro-competitive policies.
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Tax Incentives for Research and Development
The tax code automatically treats research and development expenditures by 
firms more generously than tangible capital investment. In particular, because most 
R&D expenses are current costs—like scientists’ wages and lab materials—they can 
be written off in the year in which they occur. By contrast, investments in  long-lasting 
assets such as plant, equipment, and buildings must be written off over a multiyear 
period; this allows a firm to reduce its tax liabilities only at some point in the future. 
But over and above this tax structure advantage, many countries provide addi-
tional fiscal incentives for research and development, such as allowing an additional 
deduction to be made against tax liabilities. For example, if firms treat 100 percent 
of their R&D as a current expense, and the corporate income tax rate is 20 percent, 
then every $1 of R&D expenditure reduces corporate taxes by $0.20. However, if a 
government allows a 150 percent rate of superdeduction, again assuming a corpo-
rate tax rate of 20 percent, then $1 of R&D spending would reduce corporate taxes 
by $0.30. President Reagan introduced the first Research and Experimentation 
Tax Credit in the United States in 1981. This policy currently costs the US federal 
government about $11 billion a year in foregone tax revenue (National Science 
Board 2018), with an additional $2 billion a year of lost tax revenue from  state-level 
R&D tax credits (which started in Minnesota in 1982).
The OECD (2018) reports that 33 of the 42 countries it examined provide some 
material level of tax generosity toward research and development. The US federal 
R&D tax credit is in the bottom  one-third of OECD nations in terms of generosity, 
reducing the cost of US R&D spending by about 5 percent. This is mainly because 
the US tax credit is based on the incremental increase in a firm’s R&D over a histori-
cally defined base level, rather than being a subsidy based on the total amount of 
R&D spending. In countries with the most generous provisions, such as France, 
Portugal, and Chile, the corresponding tax incentives reduce the cost of R&D by 
more than 30 percent. 
Do research and development tax credits actually work to raise R&D spending? 
The answer seems to be “yes.” One narrow approach to the question asks whether 
the quantity of R&D increases when its tax price falls. This question is of interest in 
part because most people (and many expert surveys) suggest that R&D is driven by 
advances in basic science and perhaps by market demand, rather than by tax incen-
tives. There are now a large number of studies that examine changes in the rules 
determining the generosity of tax incentives by using a variety of data and method-
ologies (for a survey, see Becker 2015). Many early studies used  cross-country panel 
data (Bloom, Griffith, and Van Reenen 2002) or US  cross-state data (Wilson 2009) 
and related changes in R&D to changes in tax rules. Some more recent studies have 
used  firm-level data and exploited differential effects of tax rules across firms before 
a surprise policy change. For example, firms below a size threshold may receive a 
more generous tax treatment, so one can compare firms just below and just above 
the threshold after (and before) the policy change by using a regression discon-
tinuity design (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2016). Taking the macro and micro studies 
together, a reasonable overall conclusion would be that a 10 percent fall in the tax 
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price of R&D results in at least a 10 percent increase in R&D in the long run; that 
is, the absolute elasticity of R&D capital with respect to its  tax-adjusted user cost is 
unity or greater.
One concern for both research and policy is that firms may relabel existing 
expenditures as “research and development” to take advantage of the more 
generous tax breaks. Chen et al. (2019), for example, found substantial relabeling 
following a change in Chinese corporate tax rules. A direct way to assess the success 
of the R&D tax credit is to look at other outcomes such as patenting, productivity, or 
jobs. Encouragingly, these more direct measures also seem to increase (with a lag) 
following tax changes (for US evidence, see Lucking 2019 and Akcigit et al. 2018; 
for the United Kingdom, see Dechezleprêtre et al. 2016; for China, see Chen et al. 
2019; and for Norway, see Bøler, Moxnes, and  Ulltveit-Moe 2015).
Another concern is that research and development tax credits may not raise 
aggregate R&D but rather may simply cause a relocation toward geographical 
areas with more generous fiscal incentives and away from geographical areas with 
less generous incentives. US policymakers may not care so much if tax credits 
shift activity from, say, Europe to the United States, but we expect them to care if 
 state-specific credits simply shift around activity from one state to another. There 
are a wide variety of local policies explicitly trying to relocate innovative activity 
across places within the United States by offering increasingly generous subsidies. 
For example, Amazon’s second headquarters generated fierce competition, with 
some cities offering subsidies up to $5 billion. This is likely to cause some distor-
tions, as the areas that bid the most are not always the places where the research will 
be most socially valuable. 
There is some evidence of relocation in response to tax incentives. In the 
context of individual inventor mobility and personal tax rates, Moretti and Wilson 
(2017) find  cross-state relocation within the United States, and Akcigit, Baslandze, 
and Stantcheva (2016) document a similar relocation pattern in an interna-
tional dimension. Wilson (2009) and Bloom and Griffith (2001) also document 
some evidence of relocation in response to research and development tax credits. 
However, relocation alone does not appear to account for all of the observed 
changes in  innovation-related outcomes. Akcigit et al. (2018) test explicitly for relo-
cation and estimate effects of tax incentive changes on nonrelocating incumbents. 
Overall, the conclusion from this literature is that despite some relocation across 
place, the aggregate effect of R&D tax credits at the national level both on the 
volume of R&D and on productivity is substantial.
Patent Boxes
“Patent boxes,” first introduced by Ireland in the 1970s, are special tax 
regimes that apply a lower tax rate to revenues linked to patents relative to other 
commercial revenues. By the end of 2015, patent boxes (or similarly structured 
tax incentives related to intellectual property) were used in 16 OECD coun-
tries (Guenther 2017). Although patent box schemes purport to be a way of 
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incentivizing research and development, in practice they induce tax competition 
by encouraging firms to shift their intellectual property royalties into different tax 
jurisdictions. Patent boxes provide a system through which firms can  manipulate 
stated revenues from patents to minimize their global tax burden (Griffith, Miller, 
and O’Connell 2014) because firms—particularly multinational firms—have 
considerable leeway in deciding where they will book their taxable income from 
intellectual property. Although it may be attractive for governments to use patent 
box policies to collect footloose tax revenues (Choi 2019), such policies do not 
have much effect on the real location or the quantity of either R&D or innovation. 
Gaessler, Hall, and Harhoff (2018) find a small effect of the introduction of patent 
boxes in several EU countries on transfers of the ownership of patents, but zero 
effect on real invention.
Our take is that patent boxes are an example of a harmful form of tax competi-
tion that distorts the tax system under the guise of being a  pro-innovation policy. 
In contrast to  well-designed research and development tax credits—for which it is 
hard to manipulate the stated location of research labs—patent boxes should be 
discouraged.
Government Research Grants
A disadvantage of  tax-based support for research and development is that tax 
policies are difficult to target at the R&D that creates the most knowledge spillovers 
and avoids business-stealing. In contrast,  government-directed grants can more 
naturally do this type of targeting by focusing on, for example, basic R&D, such 
as that performed in universities, rather than more applied R&D that occurs in an 
industry setting. A variety of government programs seek to encourage innovation by 
providing grant funding, either to academic researchers—such as through the US 
National Institutes of Health (NIH)—or to private firms, such as through the Small 
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. How effective are these programs? 
Evaluating the effectiveness of grant funding for research and development is 
challenging. Public research grants usually (and understandably) attempt to target 
the most promising researchers, the most promising projects, or the most socially 
important problems. As a result, it is difficult to construct a counterfactual for what 
would otherwise have happened to the researchers, firms, or projects that receive 
public R&D funds. If $1 of public R&D simply crowds out $1 of private R&D that 
would otherwise have been invested in the same project, then public R&D could 
have no real effect on overall R&D allocations (much less on productivity or growth). 
However, it is also possible that public R&D grants add to private R&D spending, or 
even that public R&D “crowds in” and attracts additional private R&D spending. 
Jacob and Lefgren (2011) use administrative data on US grant applications 
to the National Institutes of Health and effectively compare academic applicants 
who just barely received and just missed receiving large NIH grants. They document 
that these grants produce positive but small effects on research output, leading to 
about one additional publication over five years (an increase of 7 percent). One 
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explanation for this modest effect is that marginal unsuccessful NIH grant applicants 
often obtain other sources of funding to continue their research. Consistent with 
that story, productivity effects are larger among researchers who are likely to be more 
reliant on NIH funding (for whom alternative funding sources may be less likely to 
be available). 
Looking beyond academic output, public research and development grants 
may affect private firms in several ways. First, public R&D grants to academics 
can generate spillovers to private firms. Azoulay, Graff Zivin, et al. (2019) exploit 
 quasi-experimental variation in funding from the National Institutes of Health across 
research areas to show that a $10 million increase in NIH funding to academics 
leads to 2.7 additional patents filed by private firms. Second, private firms them-
selves sometimes conduct publicly funded R&D. Moretti et al. (2019) use changes in 
military R&D spending, which is frequently driven by exogenous political changes, 
to look at the effect of public subsidies for military R&D. They document that a 
10 percent increase in publicly funded R&D to private firms results in a 3 percent 
increase in private R&D, suggesting that public R&D crowds in private R&D (and 
also, they document, raises productivity growth). Third, private firms can directly 
receive public subsidies. Howell (2017) examines outcomes for Small Business 
Innovation Research grant applicants, comparing marginal winners and losers. She 
estimates that  early-stage SBIR grants roughly double the probability that a firm 
receives subsequent venture capital funding, and that receipt of an SBIR grant has 
positive impacts on firm revenue and patenting. 
Two other important aspects of public grant support for research and devel-
opment are worth mentioning. First, a substantial share of public R&D subsidies 
goes to universities, which makes sense from a policy perspective, as spillovers from 
basic academic research are likely to be much larger than those from  near-market 
applied research. There certainly appears to be a correlation between areas with 
strong  science-based universities and private sector innovation (for example, 
Silicon Valley in California, Route 128 in Massachusetts, and the Research Triangle 
in North Carolina). Jaffe (1989) pioneered research in this area by documenting 
important effects of academic R&D on corporate patenting, a finding corrobo-
rated by Belenzon and Schankerman (2013) and Hausman (2018).2 
Governments can also fund their own research and development labs—for 
example, SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory at Stanford University. These labs 
can generate more research activity and employment in the technological and 
geographical area in which the lab specializes. For example, the United Kingdom’s 
Diamond Light Source synchrotron appeared to do this (Helmers and Overman 
2016), but in that case the increase seems to have occurred mainly through reloca-
tion of research activity within the United Kingdom rather than an overall increase 
in aggregate research. 
2 Jaffe and Lerner (2001) analyze national labs, which are often managed by universities, and also 
document evidence of spillovers. Valero and Van Reenen (2019) offer a generally positive survey on 
the impact of universities on productivity overall and on innovation specifically. Hausman (2018) and 
Andrews (2019) also find positive effects of universities on US innovation. 
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There has also been controversy over how to design complementary policies 
that enable the resulting discoveries—when made at universities—to be translated 
into technologies that benefit consumers. The 1980 Bayh–Dole Act in the United 
States made some key changes in the ownership of inventions developed with public 
research and development support. In part because of Bayh–Dole, universities have 
an ownership share in the intellectual property developed by those working at their 
institutions, and many universities set up “technology transfer offices” to provide 
additional support for the commercialization of research. Lach and Schankerman 
(2008) provide evidence consistent with greater ownership of innovations by scien-
tists being associated with more innovation. In addition, evidence from Norway 
presented in Hvide and Jones (2018) suggests that when university researchers 
enjoy the full rights to their innovations, they are more likely to patent inventions as 
well as launch  start-ups. That is, ideas that might have remained in the “ivory tower” 
appear more likely to be turned into real products because of changes in the finan-
cial returns to academic researchers. 
Human Capital Supply
So far, we have focused attention on policies that increase the demand for 
research and development by reducing its cost via the tax system or via direct grant 
funding. However, consider an example in which we assume that scientists carry out 
all R&D and that the total number of scientists is fixed. If the government increases 
demand for R&D, the result will simply be higher wages for scientists, with zero 
effect on the quantity of R&D or innovation. Of course, this example is extreme. 
There is likely to be some ability to substitute away from other factors into R&D. 
Similarly, there is likely some elasticity of scientist supply in the long run as wages 
rise and, through immigration from other countries, in the short run.3 However, 
the underlying message is that increasing the quantity of innovative activity requires 
increasing the supply of workers with the human capital needed to carry out research, 
as emphasized by Romer (2001). This rise in supply increases the volume of innova-
tion directly as well as boosting R&D indirectly by reducing the equilibrium price of 
R&D workers. In addition, since these workers are highly paid, increasing the supply 
of scientific human capital will also tend to decrease wage inequality. 
Many policy tools are available that can increase the supply of scientific human 
capital. In terms of frontier innovation, perhaps the most direct policy is to increase 
the quantity and quality of inventors. There have been many attempts to increase 
the number of individuals with training in science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics (commonly known as STEM). Evaluating the success of such policies 
3 This insight also suggests that general equilibrium effects of a research and development tax credit may 
partially undermine its effects on innovation. These effects are hard to detect with micro data. Some 
macro studies do show partial crowding out (Goolsbee 1998), whereas others do not (Bloom, Griffith, 
and Van Reenen 2002). Atkeson and Burstein (forthcoming) put these together in a macro model that 
shows large  long-run welfare effects of innovation policies.
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is difficult given that these policies tend to be economy-wide, with effects that will 
play out only in the long run. 
One strand of this literature has focused on the location, expansion, and 
regulation of universities as key suppliers of workers in science, technology, engi-
neering, and mathematics. For example, Toivanen and Väänänen (2016) document 
that individuals growing up around a technical university (such institutions rapidly 
expanded in the 1960s and 1970s in Finland) were more likely to become engi-
neers and inventors. Of course, such policies could increase the supply of workers 
with qualifications in STEM fields, but research and innovation by university faculty 
could also directly affect local area outcomes.
Bianchi and Giorcelli (2018) present results from a more direct test of the 
former explanation by exploiting a change in the enrollment requirements 
for Italian majors in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, which 
expanded the number of graduates. They document that this exogenous increase in 
STEM majors led to more innovation in general, with effects concentrated in partic-
ular in chemistry, medicine, and information technology. They also document a 
general “leakage” problem that may accompany efforts to simply increase the STEM 
pipeline: many  STEM-trained graduates may choose to work in sectors that are not 
especially focused on research and development or innovation, such as finance. 
Migration offers an alternative lens into the effects of human capital on innova-
tion. Historically, the United States has had a relatively open immigration policy that 
helped to make the nation a magnet for talent. Immigrants make up 18 percent of 
the US labor force aged 25 and over but constitute 26 percent of the science, tech-
nology, engineering, and mathematics workforce. Immigrants also own 28 percent 
of  higher-quality patents (as measured by those filed in patent offices of at least two 
countries) and hold 31 percent of all PhDs (Shambaugh, Nunn, and Portman 2017). 
A considerable body of research supports the idea that US immigrants, especially 
 high-skilled immigrants, have boosted innovation. For example, Kerr and Lincoln 
(2010) exploit policy changes affecting the number of  H1-B visas and argue that the 
positive effects come solely through the new migrants’ own innovation.4 Using state 
panel data from 1940 to 2000, Hunt and  Gauthier-Loiselle (2010) document that 
a 1 percentage point increase in immigrant college graduates’ population share 
increases patents per capita by 9 to 18 percent, and they argue for a spillover effect 
to the rest of the population. Bernstein et al. (2018) use the death of an inventor 
as an exogenous shock to team productivity and argue for large spillover effects of 
immigrants on native innovation. 
The US federal government’s introduction of immigration quotas with varying 
degrees of strictness in the early 1920s—for example, Southern Europeans, such as 
Italians, were more strongly affected than Northern Europeans, such as Swedes—has 
4 Using  H1-B visa lotteries, Doran, Gelber, and Isen (2014) estimate smaller effects than Kerr and Lincoln 
(2010). By contrast, Borjas and Doran (2012) document negative effects on publications by Americans 
in mathematics journals following the fall of the Soviet Union, although they do not attempt to estimate 
aggregate effects; their findings may reflect a feature specific to academic publishing, where there are 
( short-run) constraints on the sizes of academic journals and departments. Moser, Voena, and Waldinger 
(2014) estimate that most of the effect of immigration on innovation came from new entry.
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been used to document how exogenous reductions in immigration damaged inno-
vation. Moser and San (2019) use rich biographical data to show that these quotas 
discouraged Eastern and Southern European scientists from coming to the United 
States and that this reduced aggregate invention. Doran and Yoon (2018) also find 
negative effects of these quotas. Moser, Voena, and Waldinger (2014) show that 
American innovation in chemistry was boosted by the arrival of Jewish scientists who 
were expelled by the German Nazi regime in the 1930s. 
Overall, most of the available evidence suggests that increasing the supply of 
human capital through expanded university programs and/or relaxed immigration 
rules is likely to be an effective innovation policy.
A final way to increase the quantity supplied of research and development is 
to reduce the barriers to talented people becoming inventors in the first place. 
Children born in  low-income families, women, and minorities are much less likely 
to become successful inventors. Bell et al. (2019), for example, document that US 
children born into the top 1 percent of the parental income distribution are ten 
times more likely to grow up to be inventors than are those born in the bottom 
half of the distribution. The authors show that relatively little of this difference 
is related to innate ability. A more important cause of the lower invention rate 
for disadvantaged groups appears to be differential exposure rates to inventors 
in childhood. This implies that improved neighborhoods, better school quality, 
and greater exposure to inventor role models and mentoring could arguably raise 
 long-run innovation. 
Intellectual Property
The phrase “intellectual property” is often used to refer to a suite of poli-
cies including patents, copyrights, and other instruments such as trademarks. 
Although these policies have some broad similarities, they differ in meaningful 
ways. For example, a patent grants—in exchange for disclosure of an invention—
a  limited-term property right to an inventor, during which time the inventor 
has the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling their invention. A 
copyright, in contrast, provides a limited term of protection to original literary, 
dramatic, musical, and artistic works, during which time the author has the right 
to determine whether, and under what conditions, others can use their work. The 
legal rules governing patents and copyrights are distinct, and the practical details 
of their implementation are quite different; for example, copyright exists from 
the moment a work is created (although as a practical matter it can be difficult 
to bring a lawsuit for infringement if you do not register the copyright), whereas 
an inventor must actively choose to file a patent application, and patent applica-
tions are reviewed by patent examiners. Nonetheless, patents and copyrights have 
many similarities from an economic perspective, and economists—to the chagrin 
of some lawyers—often lump the two types of policies together.
Boldrin and Levine (2013, in this journal) have argued that the patent 
system should be completely abolished, based on the view that there is no 
176     Journal of Economic Perspectives
evidence that patents serve to increase innovation and productivity. Although 
the patent system has many problems, outright abolition is—in our view—an 
excessive response. However, many different elements of patents could be strength-
ened or loosened. We focus here on two specific areas currently under active 
policy debate. 
First, what types of technologies should be patent eligible? The US Patent 
and Trademark Office is tasked with awarding patent rights to inventions that are 
novel, nonobvious, and useful and whose application satisfies the public disclo-
sure requirement. The US Supreme Court has long interpreted Section 101 of 
Title 35 of the US Code as implying that abstract ideas, natural phenomena, and 
laws of nature are patent-ineligible. Several recent Court rulings have relied on 
Section 101 to argue that various types of inventions should no longer be patent 
eligible: business methods (Bilski v. Kappos, 561 US 593 [2010]), medical diag-
nostic tests (Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 US 66 
[2012]), human genes (Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 
569 US 576 [2013]), and software (Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 573 US 
208 [2014]). A reasonable interpretation of these legal rulings is that the Court 
is “carving out” certain areas where the perceived social costs of patents outweigh 
the perceived social benefits. For example, in the 2012 Mayo v. Prometheus case, the 
Court argued that the patenting of abstract ideas such as medical diagnostic tests 
might impede, more than encourage, innovation. This question is fundamentally 
empirical, but the available empirical evidence provides only rather inconclusive 
hints at the answer to that question, rather than a systematic basis for policy guid-
ance (Williams 2013, 2017; Sampat and Williams 2019). 
Second, many current debates about patent reform center on “patent trolls,” 
a pejorative term that refers to certain “nonpracticing entities,” or patent owners 
who do not manufacture or use a patented invention but instead buy patents 
and then seek to enforce patent rights against accused infringers. The key ques-
tion here is whether litigation by  so-called patent trolls is frivolous. On one 
hand, Haber and Levine (2014) argue that the recent uptick in patent litigation 
generally associated with the rise of patent trolls may in fact not be evidence of 
a problem. They argue that—historically—spikes in litigation have coincided 
with the introduction of disruptive technologies (such as the telegraph and the 
automobile) and that there is no evidence that the current patent system either 
harms product quality or increases prices. On the other hand, Cohen, Gurun, 
and Kominers (2016) find that nonpracticing entities (unlike practicing enti-
ties) sue firms that experience increases in their cash holdings. They interpret 
this interesting  connection as evidence that—on average—nonpracticing enti-
ties act as patent trolls, but this evidence provides little information about the 
importance of these types of  incentives in explaining the broader observed trends 
in patenting or innovation. While several other author teams have investigated 
various aspects of patent trolling (Abrams, Akcigit, and Grennan 2018; Lemley 
and Simcoe 2018; Feng and Jaravel forthcoming), the past literature has struggled 
to establish clear evidence that many or most nonpracticing entities are associated 
with  welfare-reducing behavior. 
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Product Market Competition and International Trade
The impact of competition on innovation is theoretically ambiguous. On the 
negative side, Schumpeter (1942) argued that the desired reward for innovation 
is monopoly profits, and increasing competition tends to reduce those incen-
tives. More broadly, settings with high competition may tend to imply lower future 
profits, which in turn will limit the internal funds available to finance research 
and development, which may be important given the financial frictions discussed 
above. 
But there are also ways in which competition may encourage innovation. First, 
monopolists who benefit from high barriers to entry have little incentive to innovate 
and replace the stream of supernormal profits they already enjoy, in contrast to a 
new entrant who has no rents to lose (this is the “replacement effect,” described in 
Arrow 1962). Second, tougher competition can induce managers to work harder 
and innovate more. Finally, capital and labor are often “trapped” within firms (for 
example, restricted by the costs of hiring employees or moving capital). If compe-
tition removes the market for a firm’s product, it will be forced to innovate to 
redeploy these factors (Bloom et al. 2019). In some models, the impact of competi-
tion on innovation is plotted as an inverted U: when competition is low, the impact 
of greater competition on innovation first is positive, then becomes negative at 
higher levels of competition (see, for example, Aghion et al. 2005). 
The bottom line is that the net impact of competition on innovation remains an 
open empirical question. However, existing empirical evidence suggests that compe-
tition typically increases innovation, especially in markets that initially have low 
levels of competition. Much of this literature focuses on import shocks that increase 
competition, such as China’s integration in the global market following accession 
to the World Trade Organization in 2001. Shu and Steinwender (2019) summa-
rize over 40 papers on trade and competition, arguing that in South America, Asia, 
and Europe, competition mostly drives increases in innovation (also see Blundell, 
Griffith, and Van Reenen 1999; Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen 2016). In North 
America, the impact of import competition is more mixed; for example, Autor et 
al. (2016) argue that Chinese import competition reduced innovation in US manu-
facturing, although Xu and Gong (2017) argue these research and development 
employees displaced from manufacturing were  re-employed in services, generating 
an ambiguous overall impact. 
In addition to its effect on competition, trade openness can increase innovation 
by increasing market size, thus spreading the cost of innovation over a larger market 
(for example, Grossman and Helpman 1991). Moreover, trade leads to improved 
inputs and a faster diffusion of knowledge (for example, Diamond 1997; Keller 
2004). Aghion et al. (2018) use shocks to a firm’s export markets to demonstrate 
large positive effects on innovation in French firms. Atkin et al. (2017) implemented 
a randomized controlled trial to stimulate exports in small apparel firms in Egypt 
and found that exporting increases firms’ productivity and quality. The benefits of 
superior imported inputs have been shown in a number of papers (including Gold-
berg et al. 2010; Fieler and Harrison 2018). 
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In our view, the policy prescription from this literature seems reasonably clear: 
greater competition and trade openness typically increase innovation. The finan-
cial costs of these policies are relatively low, given that there are additional positive 
impacts associated with policies that lower prices and increase choice. The downside 
is that such globalization shocks may increase inequality among people and places.
Targeting Small Firms
Financial constraints are often the rationale for focusing innovation policies on 
small firms. For example, in many countries the research and development tax credit 
is more generous for smaller firms (OECD 2018). Moreover, small firms appear to 
respond more positively to innovation and other business support policies than larger 
firms (Criscuolo et al. 2019). However,  small-is-beautiful innovation policies have some 
problems as well. First, they can discourage firms from growing, as expanding beyond 
a certain point would disqualify them from their subsidies. Second, it is young firms, 
rather than small firms per se, that are most subject to these financial constraints. 
One popular policy seeks to co-locate many smaller  high-tech firms together. 
This may be in a  high-density accelerator (intensive mentoring; highly selected) 
or incubator (less support; less selected) or in a larger science park. The idea is 
to generate agglomeration effects. There are several case studies and one metare-
view of this approach that suggest the overall impact of these policies is positive 
(Madaleno et al. 2018). Our sense, however, is that the evidence remains ambiguous 
here, despite the great popularity of these initiatives with local governments.
To the extent that financial frictions are impactful, removing constraints on the 
development of an active  early-stage finance market (like angel finance or venture 
capital) might be a reasonable policy focus. In addition, focusing on subsidized loans 
for young firms, rather than general tax breaks or grants, may be more desirable.
More Moonshots? A  Mission-Oriented Approach
Throughout this article, we have taken a pragmatic and marginal approach: 
given a policymaker’s constraints, what is the best use of resources to stimulate 
growth through innovation? However, this approach may be too conservative given 
the scale of the current productivity problems. 
Instead, some recent proposals have aimed at spurring a step change in produc-
tivity growth. Taking inspiration from the research and development efforts during 
World War II and Kennedy’s Apollo “moonshot,” “ mission-oriented” R&D policies 
focus support on particular technologies or sectors. Many such  mission-oriented 
policies in defense (such as DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency) and space (such as NASA, the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion) have led to important innovations. Azoulay, Fuchs, et al. (2019) offer a detailed 
discussion of the “ARPA model”—an approach that has expanded beyond DARPA 
to HSARPA in the Department of Homeland Security, IARPA for US intelligence 
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agencies, and  ARPA-E in the Department of Energy. They argue that successful 
examples  typically involve decentralization, active project selection (and a tolerance 
for inevitable  failures), and organizational flexibility. 
Economists are often skeptical of such  sector-focused policies, because political 
 decision-making may be more likely to favor sectors or firms that engage in lobbying 
and regulatory capture, rather than the most socially beneficial. Moreover, in many 
cases it may be hard to articulate an economic rationale behind these moonshots. 
Surely, the resources used in putting a man on the moon could have been directed 
more efficiently if the aim was solely to generate more innovation. 
We see two main arguments for  mission-based moonshots. First, moonshots 
may be justified in and of themselves. Technology to address climate change falls 
into this category: there is a pressing need to avoid environmental catastrophe, and 
obvious market failures exist around carbon emissions. The solution requires new 
technologies to help deliver decarbonization of the economy; moonshot strategies 
may result in the most valuable innovation in this case. Similar comments could be 
made of other social goals, such as disease reduction. It is important to remember 
that when the rate and direction of technological change are endogenous, conven-
tional policies such as a carbon tax can be doubly effective (both by reducing carbon 
emissions and by generating incentives to direct research and development toward 
green technologies; see Acemoglu et al. 2012; Aghion et al. 2016). 
Second, moonshots may be justified on the basis of political economy consider-
ations. To generate significant extra resources for research, a politically sustainable 
vision needs to be created. For example, Gruber and Johnson (2019) argue that 
increasing federal funding of research as a share of GDP by half a percent—from 
0.7 percent today to 1.2 percent, still lower than the almost 2 percent share observed 
in 1964 in Figure 1—would create a $100 billion fund that could jump-start new 
technology hubs in some of the more educated but less prosperous American cities 
(such as Rochester, New York, and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania). They argue that such 
a fund could generate local spillovers and, by alleviating spatial inequality, be more 
politically sustainable than having research funds primarily flow to areas with highly 
concentrated research, such as Palo Alto, California, and Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Of course, it is difficult to bring credible econometric evidence to bear on 
the efficacy and efficiency of moonshots. We can discuss historical episodes and 
use theory to guide our thinking, but moonshots are, by nature, highly selected 
episodes with no obvious counterfactuals. 
Conclusions
Market economies are likely to underprovide innovation, primarily due to 
knowledge spillovers between firms. This article has discussed the evidence on 
policy tools that aim to increase innovation. 
We condense our (admittedly subjective) judgements into Table 2, which could 
be used as a toolkit for innovation policymakers. Column 1 summarizes our read of 
the quality of the currently available empirical evidence in terms of both the quantity 
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of papers and the credibility of the evidence provided by those studies. Column 
2 summarizes the conclusiveness of the evidence for policy. Column 3 scores the 
overall benefits minus costs (that is, the net benefit), in terms of a light bulb ranking 
where three is the highest. This ranking is meant to represent a composite of the 
strength of the evidence and the magnitude of average effects. Columns 4 and 5 are 
two other criteria: first, whether the main effects would be short term (say, within 
the next three to four years), medium term, or long term (approximately ten years 
or more), and second, the likely effects on inequality. Different policymakers (and 
citizens) will assign different weights to these criteria.
In the short run, research and development tax credits and direct public funding 
seem the most effective, whereas increasing the supply of human capital (for example, 
through expanding university admissions in the areas of science, technology, engi-
neering, and mathematics) is more effective in the long run. Encouraging skilled 
immigration has big effects even in the short run. Competition and open trade poli-
cies probably have benefits that are more modest for innovation, but they are cheap 
in financial terms and so also score highly. One difference is that R&D subsidies and 
open trade policies are likely to increase inequality, partly by increasing the demand 
for highly skilled labor and partly, in the case of trade, because some communities will 
endure the pain of trade adjustment and job loss. In contrast, increasing the supply 
of highly skilled labor is likely to reduce inequality by easing competition for scarce 
human capital.
Of course, others will undoubtedly take different views on the policies listed in 
Table 2. Nevertheless, we hope that this framework at least prompts additional debate 
over what needs to be done to restore equitable growth in the modern economy.
Table 2 
Innovation Policy Toolkit
Policy
Quality of 
evidence
(1)
Conclusiveness  
of evidence
(2)
Net benefit
(3)
Time frame
(4)
Effect on  
inequality
(5)
Direct R&D grants Medium Medium Medium run ↑
R&D tax credits High High Short run ↑
Patent box Medium Medium Negative NA ↑
Skilled immigration High High Short to medium run ↓
Universities: incentives Medium Low Medium run ↑
Universities: STEM supply Medium Medium Long run ↓
Trade and competition High Medium Medium run ↑
Intellectual property reform Medium Low Unknown Medium run Unknown
Mission-oriented policies Low Low Medium run Unknown
Source: The authors.
Notes: This is our highly subjective reading of the evidence. Column 1 reflects a mixture of the number of 
studies and the quality of the research design. Column 2 indicates whether the existing evidence delivers 
any firm policy conclusions. Column 3 is our assessment of the magnitude of the benefits minus the costs 
(assuming these are positive). Column 4 delineates whether the main benefits (if there are any) are likely 
to be seen in the short run (roughly, the next three to four years) or in the longer run (roughly ten years 
or more); NA means not applicable. Column 5 lists the likely effect on inequality.
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